Abstract. Most state-of-the-art approaches of securing XML documents are based on a partial annotation of an XML tree with security labels which are later propagated to unlabeled nodes of the XML so that the resulting labeling is full (i.e. defined for every XML node). The first contribution of this paper is an investigation of possible alternatives for policy definition that lead to a fully annotated XML. We provide a classification of policies using different options of security label propagation and conflict resolution. Our second contribution is a generalized algorithm that constructs a full DTD annotation (from the the partial one) w.r.t. the policy classification. Finally, we discuss the query rewriting approach for our model of XML security views.
Introduction
In [1] , we presented a generalized notion of XML security views. The intuition behind XML security views is similar to that of multi-level security views for a relational database [2] : views are virtual tables that are defined by multilevel relational expressions over the multilevel relations and are evaluated each time the view is used; view evaluation yields a derived multilevel relation.
In a hierarchical structure like XML, it is hardly possible to define accessibility via a single query. Thus, for XML, we define a partial assignment of security labels to XML nodes; then, a security policy is applied to these security labels so that the partially annotated XML becomes fully annotated; finally, the latter is "sanitized", i.e. (some) nodes with negative authorizations are hidden (deleted or encrypted), but their permitted children are revealed (e.g., moved up to a permitted ancestor if a forbidden parent is deleted). This approach is used, for example, in [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] . The resulting XML tree is called authorized (T A ). Another approach to XML view calculation enforces security annotations on the schema level. The result is a DTD schema of the permitted data (or in other words, a DTD view D v ) as in [1] , [7] , [8] . Then, the materialized version of XML document (T M ) is constructed from the initial XML document by deleting forbidden nodes w.r.t. D v so that T A is isomorphic to T M . A diagram of the methodology to construct a schema for the accessible data is shown in Fig. 1 (see [1] for details).
The construction of the fully annotated document, in which every node is labeled, depends on the overall security policy [9] that is used. The first contribution of this paper is an investigation of different alternatives for policy definition and enforcement at the level of an XML tree. Our analysis shows that not all combinations of policy options satisfy the properties of completeness and consistency, i.e., result in a single fully annotated tree. We provide a classification of policies using different options of security label propagation and conflict resolution. The second contribution is a generic algorithm that constructs a fully annotated DTD D F (from the the partial one) according to the policy classification so that D F reflects a full annotation of a corresponding XML document.
The final phase of XML view construction is a computation of the document T M which conforms to D v , i.e. materialization of accessible data. However, the user often wants to know only a small part of the materialized view, e.g., an answer on some XPath query expressed in terms of D v . In this case, the materialization of the security view can be avoided by rewriting user queries over T M conforming to D v into queries over the original data, and then evaluating this query. The third contribution of this paper is the description of an algorithm for such a query rewriting.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in Sec. 2, we provide a classification of XML security policies that can be used in construction of a fully annotated XML from a partial one. Second, a general algorithm for calculation of a fully annotated DTD is presented in Sec. 3. Next, we discuss query rewriting algorithm in Sec. 4. Finally, Sec. 5 presents related work and concludes the paper.
We can classify security policies by completeness and consistency [9] . The former handles unassigned values, and the latter is to handle conflicting assignments.
Definition 1.
A policy is complete and consistent if every partially annotated tree can be extend to a single fully annotated tree.
We list here several possible policies. These are variations of classical security policies [9] :
Local Propagation (LP): "open", "closed", or "none"; Hierarchy Propagation (HP): "topDown" (td), "bottomUp" (bu), or "none"; Structural Conflict Resolution (SC): "localFirst" (lf), "hierarchyFirst" (hf), or "none"; Value Conflict Resolution (VC): "denialTakesPrecedence" (dtp), "permissionTakesPrecedence" (ptp), or "none".
The LP option is similar to traditional policies for access control: in the case of "open" ("closed"), if a node is not labelled then it is labelled by Y (N); with the "none" option, an unlabeled node is not assigned any label.
The HP option specifies annotation inheritance in the tree. In the case of "td" ("bu"), an unlabelled node with a labelled parent (children) inherits the label of the latter; "none" means that no hierarchy propagation is applied. Note that the "bu" case can result in conflicts, and they should be addressed by the VC option.
The SC option specifies whether the local or hierarchy rule takes precedence ("lf" or "hf" respectively); in the case of "none", both kinds of inheritance are applied (if they are not "none") resulting in more than one possible annotations and the "winning" label is defined based on the VC option. The latter specifies how to resolve conflicts for unlabelled nodes that are assigned different labels by the preceding rules: N always has precedence over Y ("dtp"); Y always has precedence over N ("ptp"), and no choice ("none").
Finally, we also use most-specific-takes-precedence (MSTP) policy [9] that prohibits propagation of labels on already labeled nodes.
We represent all the possible policy options in Table 1 , where symbol " * " means "any", i.e. any possible value from the appropriate set 1 . All the other policies are classified as unresolvable since they do not result in a unique fully annotated tree.
In the next section, we will show how to construct a full DTD annotation (from the the partial one) for every specified policy class.
Construction of Security View
We start with the definition of a DTD. 
We consider that A and B are adjacent element types, i.e., form a DTD edge 2 . Since we put annotations on DTD edges, the idea behind our algorithm is to "push" security labels from generators to destination types.
After obtaining an annotation, a destination type d becomes a source type and may retransmit its annotation to generators where d is a source.
Remark 1.
In the local policy, we suppose that ann(A, B) is an annotation between parent A and its child B, i.e., pushing security labels is performed in a top-down manner that assures that there are not any conflicts at tree level since every node B has only one parent A, i.e., only one generator. Hence, we consider the local policy as a subset of the top-down policy.
Definition 6. The DTD document is called fully annotated if for every DTD node A, there is a function ann
The notion of a full annotation was defined for XML documents which have a unique full annotation provided a complete and consistent policy is given. At the schema level, however, there may be several "paths" transmitting different annotations to the same element type. Below we show how to resolve this problem.
Definition 7. We denote the set of all generators of d as G(d). An element type d with a generator
g ∈ G(d) such that ann(g) = ∅ is called expecting.
Definition 8. We say that a subset G(d) of G(d) has a simultaneous impact on ann data (d) if there exists an XML instance T conforming to a DTD schema D such that every instance of type d has a set of either outgoing or incoming edges that can be mapped to the set G(d). We call G(d) a set of simultaneous impact (SSI). Example 1. Consider a DTD:
Generators (B, D) and (C, D) belong to different SSIs on ann data (D) since a node D has either B or C parent in any XML instance. Generators (D, B) and (E, B) belong to the same SSI on ann data (B) because any node B has both D and E children in any XML instance. Generators (D, C) and (E, C) belong to different SSIs on ann data (C) as long as node C has either a D or an E child node in any XML instance.
is the same, non empty, and ann(g) is not a qualifier.
Otherwise, we use the VC resolution option if it is not "none" 3 . From the analysis of policy options follows that value conflict may arise only in the case of the bottom-up policy class, because every XML instance usually has a node with more than one child.
In Def. 9, we required that ann(g) = Q[q]. Before explaining the case when Having removed qualifiers, we can define SSIs. Obviously, for the top-down propagation, SSI contains only one generator (parent-child DTD edge), and the number of SSIs is equal to the number of parents in DTD graph. However, the 
3:
In s → P (s)
4:
5:
// After step 5, the next step has the meaning only for bottom-up policy class 6:
// After step 5, the next step has the meaning only for top-down policy class 7: 
we rename d as s and d as d.
We assume that every initially annotated DTD element type e (e.g., root or all leaves for bottom-up propagation) automatically retransmits its annotation to all generators g = (e, d ) such that ann(g) = ∅. 
3:
Connect source s i of every generator
4: for every generator g = (d, d ) where d is a source do 5: 
18:
else
19:
Enqueue(queue, d);
Fig. 4. Algorithm Annotate View
The generic algorithm Annotate View is shown in Fig 4. It starts with a preprocessing procedure which is needed only for the local policy to define and apply a default labeling for non-annotated generators. After the preprocessing and qualifier removing steps, we invoke labeling iterations via queue [10] . d is expecting) .
Finally, we remove the N-labeled nodes from the fully annotated DTD. This algorithm is identical to that in [1] . 
Query Rewriting Algorithm Description
In this section we show the algorithm for query rewriting. The query language is that of the CoreXPath of Gottlob et al. [11] augmented with the union operator and atomic tests and which is denoted by Benedict et al. [12] as X . The algorithm for query rewriting has two phases: query parsing and further translation of the parsed query into σ-functions. Query parsing phase implies that user query is represented as a tree of subqueries (parse tree) according to the grammar that we have shown in Def. 12.
The translation of the parsed query starts from the leaves of the parse tree and moves up to the root path . In particular, for each subquery p and an element A, the algorithm calculates QR (p,A) using Query Rewrite(p i , B j ), where p i is a direct subquery (child in a parse tree) of p and B j is a node reachable from A via p i in D v . At the same time, the algorithm calculates reach(p, A) representing the set of nodes reachable from node A via the path p. To obtain a rewriting of the initial user query q, we invoke Query Rewrite(q, root). 6:
where q0 is nodeT est 8:
9:
10: else if q is qual then // q = qual from Def. 12
11:
if q has no operands then
12:
QR (q,A) :=Query Rewrite(q, A); // q is path
13:
else if q has one (not) operand then
14:
QR (q,A) = not Query Rewrite(q 0 , A); // where q 0 is the operand;
15:
else if q has two operands then // q 1 is the first operand, q 2 is the second operand; op 2 is one of and, or, =, =, ≥, ≤;
16: We introduce two auxiliary functions: processChildP arent (that captures possibilities 1 and 2) in Fig. 8 and processDescendAncest (handling possibility 3) in Fig. 7 . The symbol ↓ * (↑ * ) is used to denote the subquery q = descendant-or-self (ancestor-or-self ). 
with c i1 as the child of B (since p i is applied to B), c in i is A, each c ij is a child of c i j−1 , f i j is a filter expression for the node c i j . Then σ −1 (B, A) is defined as follows:
where each
is applied to the node A. The algorithm of σ −1 (B, A) calculation directly follows from Def. 13. We do not show it here for the lack of the space.
The algorithm processChildP arent is presented in Fig. 8 . The expression max σ (A, B) , σ −1 (B, A) in line 2 selects the non-empty element from σ(A, B) and σ −1 (B, A) (one of them is always empty, while the other is not). The last expression is calculated according to Def. 13.
The closest approach to query rewriting is presented by Fan et al. in [8] . The main differences are: the algorithm derives a security view without any dummy element types which may be a source of sensitive information leakage. Therefore, the σ-function used in our query rewriting has different semantics. An extended XPath fragment has parent and descendant-or-self axes. Finally, Fan et al. use dynamic programming so that QR (q,A) is calculated for every DTD element type A; while we perform a rewriting of q w.r.t. to a subset of relevant element types A of DTD in a recursive manner.
Related Work and Conclusion
The mapping between existing policy frameworks and our proposal is summarized in Table 2 . Note that our Y(N) label corresponds to "grant" ("deny"), + (−) of other models. The comparison of some other access control parameters is shown in Table 3 .
The provisional access control model for XML documents [6] considers both top-down and bottom-up propagation. Since the rule most specific takes precedence (MSTP) is not used, arising conflicts are resolved by the VC option. In the case of the presence of unresolved conflicts or unlabeled nodes, a special default option (Y or N) is applied. The policy is evaluated at the stage of query answering (we marked it in Table 3 as "policy evaluation" (PE)). If access to the requested node is permitted, the user receives "weak" XML view, where N-labeled nodes having Y-children are revealed without their attributes.
